Moral Rationalization Contributes More Strongly to Escalation of Unethical Behavior Among Low Moral Identifiers Than Among High Moral Identifiers by Mulder, Laetitia & van Dijk, Eric
  
 University of Groningen
Moral Rationalization Contributes More Strongly to Escalation of Unethical Behavior Among
Low Moral Identifiers Than Among High Moral Identifiers





IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2020
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Mulder, L., & van Dijk, E. (2020). Moral Rationalization Contributes More Strongly to Escalation of
Unethical Behavior Among Low Moral Identifiers Than Among High Moral Identifiers. Frontiers in
Psychology, 10, 1-14. [2912]. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02912
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 21-02-2020
fpsyg-10-02912 December 20, 2019 Time: 16:9 # 1
ORIGINAL RESEARCH








Università degli Studi “G. d’Annunzio”








This article was submitted to
Personality and Social Psychology,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 20 September 2019
Accepted: 09 December 2019
Published: 08 January 2020
Citation:
Mulder LB and van Dijk E (2020)
Moral Rationalization Contributes
More Strongly to Escalation
of Unethical Behavior Among Low





More Strongly to Escalation of
Unethical Behavior Among Low
Moral Identifiers Than Among High
Moral Identifiers
Laetitia B. Mulder1* and Eric van Dijk2
1 Department of Human Resource Management and Organizational Behaviour, University of Groningen, Groningen,
Netherlands, 2 Department of Social, Economic and Organizational Psychology, Leiden University, Leiden, Netherlands
Occasional acts of immorality are commonplace. One way in which people deal with
their own prior immoral acts, is to rationalize why their acts are morally acceptable. It has
been argued that such post hoc moral rationalizations may contribute to continuation or
escalation of immoral behavior. This paper experimentally tests this causal influence of
post hoc moral argumentation on escalation of immoral behavior and also tests how this
depends on people’s level of moral identity. In three experiments we asked participants
to generate moral arguments for their past behaviors. The results show that engaging
in moral rationalization causes subsequent continuation and escalation of previous
immoral behavior, but more so for low moral identifiers than for high moral identifiers.
Keywords: moral rationalization, moral disengagement, moral identity, escalation, behavioral ethics
INTRODUCTION
People occasionally engage in acts of behavior that can be considered as ethically questionable. Most
people, for example, will at some point tell a lie, or benefit themselves at the expense of others. Not
all these behaviors will be equally severe, and oftentimes it may even be unclear whether behaviors
should be seen as unethical. Nevertheless, little sins may become problematic if they are repeated
and escalate into worse types of unethical behavior (Ashforth and Anand, 2003; Anand et al., 2005;
Martens et al., 2007; Gino and Bazerman, 2009; Zyglidopoulos and Fleming, 2009; Martens et al.,
2010; Welsh et al., 2015).
Traditionally, research on ethical behavior has focused on explaining why people engage in
unethical acts by focusing on what caused the act; e.g., by asking why people would put their own
interests first (e.g., Murphy and Dacin, 2011; Moore et al., 2012), or whether some people are more
likely to engage in unethical behaviors than others (e.g., Berry et al., 2007; Tijdink et al., 2016).
It should be acknowledged, however, that even good people who care about morality, sometimes
engage in unethical behaviors (Bersoff, 1999; Mazar et al., 2008; De Cremer, 2011; Bazerman and
Sezer, 2016). As a result, it is equally relevant to understand what follows the act, i.e., how people
react once they have engaged in unethical behavior. In the current paper, and in line with literature
on moral compensation (Doosje et al., 1998; Wohl et al., 2006; Sachdeva et al., 2009; Jordan et al.,
2011; Cornelissen et al., 2013; Mulder and Aquino, 2013) we thus focus on the aftermath of morally
questionable behaviors, and address the issue of whether people deal with their transgressions in a
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compensatory way or in an escalating way. We draw attention
to the possibility that people may differ in how they deal with
moral transgressions, and that these differences are related to
how central morality is to their personal identity because this
influences how much people are influenced by post hoc moral
rationalizations. More specifically, the studies we present in
this paper find that engaging in moral rationalization after a
moral transgression increases the likelihood of (further) unethical
behavior, but more so for those for whom morality is not central
for their identity.
This paper contributes to the literature on unethical behavior
in several ways. First, it contributes to the knowledge about
moral identity. Previous research demonstrated that moral
identity predicts how people react to their own previous
behavior (Mulder and Aquino, 2013), but did not tap into
the mechanisms underlying this effect. The current paper
sheds light on the mechanism of moral rationalizations that
can underlie the influence of moral identity in moral self-
management. Secondly, the paper contributes to research on
moral rationalizations (Tsang, 2002) and on similar concepts such
as moral disengagement (Bandura et al., 1996; Bandura, 1999;
Moore, 2008) and neutralizing (Sykes and Matza, 1957; De Bock
and Van Kenhove, 2011). The effects of moral rationalizations
aimed at justifying one’s previous unethical behavior have hardly
been explored. Such post hoc moral rationalization is especially
important to study as it gives insights into the temporal and
dynamic dimensions of morality (Shalvi et al., 2015). Thirdly,
the paper contributes to literature on the escalation of immoral
behavior as it highlights the causal role of moral rationalizations
in this. So far this has mainly been highlighted in theory papers
(e.g., Ashforth and Anand, 2003; Tenbrunsel and Messick, 2004;
Anand et al., 2005; Zyglidopoulos and Fleming, 2009), and in
research that studied the role of moral disengagement unethical
escalation in a correlational way (Welsh et al., 2015), which still
leaves open the question whether engaging in post hoc moral
rationalizations is actually responsible for unethical behavior
escalation. The present paper fills this void and goes a step further
by investigating how the role of post hoc moral rationalization in
escalation depends on moral identity.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Moral identity can be defined as the moral schema people
hold about their own moral character (Aquino and Reed, 2002)
and refers to the extent to which being moral is central for
a person’s sense of self (Blasi, 1984). Moral identity consists
of two dimensions: internalization and symbolization (Aquino
and Reed, 2002). Internalization refers to the private aspects of
the moral self that relate to the traits that are at the core of
one’s self concept, whereas symbolization refers to the public
aspects of the moral self and reflects traits in actions that are
observable by others. Research on moral identity often relies on
the internalization dimension of moral identity because it best
taps into the extent to which people find morality an important
aspect of who they are (e.g., Chowdhury and Fernando, 2014;
Joosten et al., 2014; Ding et al., 2016). Also in the present paper,
that concerns the influence of private moral argumentation about
one’s own previous immoral acts, we refer to the internalization
dimension of moral identity when we talk about “moral identity.”
Although moral identity has been shown to positively relate to
ethically relevant behaviors (Aquino and Reed, 2002; Reed and
Aquino, 2003; Sage et al., 2006; Hertz and Krettenauer, 2015),
a high moral identity does not necessarily translate into ethical
behavior. As Aquino and Reed pointed out, to translate into
ethical behavior, moral identities should be salient in the situation
at hand (Aquino et al., 2009). If the situation or decision at
hand does not cue one’s moral identity, there is no reason to
expect a behavioral effect of moral identity. Thus, it would be
inaccurate to say that those who value morality do not engage
in morally questionable behaviors. As Gino (2015, p. 107) put
it, “immorality is dynamic and malleable,” and individuals may
not behave consistently over situations “even when they strongly
value morality or when they see being an ethical person as central
to their self-concept.” This is especially relevant considering that,
oftentimes, we find ourselves in settings in which morality is only
mildly at stake. A setting in which the cashier mistakenly hands
you back too much change does have a moral ring to it (you
might feel that you ‘should’ tell him about this and return the
excessive change) but its moral connotation will surely be less
strongly evoked than in a setting in which you could steal money
from the counter because the cashier does not pay attention.
Indeed, we could imagine that many, including those with a
high moral identity, may have experienced settings in which
they did not correct the cashier’s mistake. In a similar vein,
research by Aquino and Becker (2005) indicated that people with
a high moral identity were willing to use deceptive strategies in
a negotiation if the setting did not cue morality but rather cued
financial gains.
The fact that good people can do bad things (Bersoff, 1999;
De Cremer, 2011), and that people who value morality may
act immorally (Gino, 2015) raises the issue of how people
with high versus low moral identities deal with their moral
transgressions. Realizing that one just has engaged in morally
questionable behavior might stimulate one to do better next time,
or even correct and compensate one’s prior behaviors (Zhong and
Liljenquist, 2006; Jordan et al., 2011; Mulder and Aquino, 2013;
Ding et al., 2016). Alternatively, research has shown that it may
be an impetus for escalation (Martens et al., 2007, 2010; Welsh
et al., 2015). It has been argued that this path is connected to
the moral rationalizations that people use to justify their prior
immoral acts (Bandura et al., 1996; Tsang, 2002; Ashforth and
Anand, 2003; Zyglidopoulos et al., 2009; Welsh et al., 2015).
These can include making up excuses such as “Everybody does
it,” “Compared to what I could have done, my act is not so
bad” and “Only little harm was done.” Such moral rationalization
can be conceived as a form of motivated reasoning (Kunda,
1990) by which people “convince themselves that their behavior
does not violate their moral standards” (Tsang, 2002), As such,
post hoc moral rationalizations may serve to alleviate guilt and
self-threat resulting from one’s previous acts and to uphold one’s
moral self-image (see also Bandura et al., 1996 and Bandura,
1999 who referred to moral disengagement). Although moral
rationalization has been identified as a way that people deal with
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previous immoral acts (e.g., Shu et al., 2011), it is still unclear
to what extent they actually impact further escalation of this
behavior. It might be the case that this differs for those with a
low moral identity versus those with a high moral identity. This
is what we seek to answer in the present paper.
Previous research by Welsh et al. (2015) suggests that moral
rationalizations do contribute to the escalation of unethical
behavior. However, their research was correlational: both
unethical behavior over time and moral rationalizations were
measured, and moral rationalizations were tested as a mediator.
Assessing mediation can be useful, but does come with some
limitations in identifying psychological processes (Spencer et al.,
2005). One of the limitations concerns the correlational nature
and the fact that the mediation found can be spurious due to
an unmeasured third factor that accounts for the relations. For
example, in the study of Welsh et al. (2015), the people who were
inclined to show unethical behavior (and escalate in this), may
also have been the type of persons to be more likely to engage in
more moral rationalizations. So their finding does not necessarily
imply that engaging in moral rationalization should be seen as the
cause of the escalation. Then, the question remains what the mere
effects of moral rationalizations are. And, more specifically, what
the effects of moral rationalizations are for people with different
kinds of general inclinations to show unethical behavior (e.g.,
high and low moral identifiers).
So how can the influence of moral rationalization on the
escalation of unethical behavior depend on moral identity?
Although it might seem that post hoc moralization is a more
important strategy for people with a high moral identity (because
they suffer the highest moral self-threat after immoral behavior),
we argue that moral rationalizations would have little impact on
the escalation of unethical behavior among those with a high
moral identity. Our reasoning for this is that rationalizations may
only work to the extent that they are successful in convincing
oneself of their validity and thus in reducing guilt. In other words,
generating moral rationalizations might be of little or no use for
those who find them unconvincing. It seems plausible that this
will apply mostly to those with a high moral identity. As high
moral identifiers are more likely to recognize violations of their
moral and social values (c.f., Skarlicki et al., 2008), they might also
be more likely to be conscious of the immoral nature of their own
past acts. So, if morality is important to you, you might be less
convinced by an argument that keeping excessive change would
be OK. If so, it could keep those with a high moral identity from
treading the escalation path.
Some first evidence that moral identity may modulate how
people deal with past transgressions was provided by Mulder
and Aquino (2013). In a series of studies they showed that
those with a high moral identity were more likely than those
scoring low on moral identity to compensate past unethical
acts (e.g., lying in a deception game; benefiting oneself at the
expense of others) by subsequent ethical acts (being honest;
donating to charity). Note, however, that these studies did not
investigate (or assess) moral rationalizations, making it unclear
whether the actions of those high in moral identity were due
to a lower engagement in moral rationalizations as compared
to those with a low moral identity. Another relevant study was
conducted by Aquino et al. (2007), who investigated to what
extent American students reported negative emotions in response
to the norm violating behaviors US soldiers in the Abu Graibh
prison. Measuring the participants’ agreement with justifications
for the soldiers’ behavior (e.g., “Taking embarrassing photos of
Iraqi prisoners is no big deal when you consider the harm Iraqis
have brought to so many people”), they found that those who
agreed more with such justifications felt less negative about the
transgressions. Importantly, this correlation was observed among
people with a low moral identity but not among those with a
high moral identity. This pattern fits the current proposition that
moral rationalizations may be more effective for those with a
low moral identity than for those with a high moral identity.
Note, however, that this study was correlational. Moreover, the
dependent variable in the Aquino and colleagues study were
judgments about unethical acts performed by others, rather
than one’s own (further) engagement in unethical behavior.
Consequently, the study touched on the moral rationalization
process, but did not directly test its influence on escalatory
unethical behavior.
APPROACH
We aimed to shed more light on the process of moral
argumentation after a past unethical act, and test whether the
process would be different for high moral identifiers than for
low moral identifiers. To increase the understanding of how
moral arguments affect behavior, and to establish the causal
path, we therefore asked participants to provide moral arguments
for their past behaviors, and we studied its impact on future
behavior. While the main theoretical focus was on whether
and how moral rationalizations might affect future behavior, we
also included a condition in which participants were asked to
provide moral objections (i.e., reason why unethical behavior
was wrong) rather than rationalizations. We included this to
control for the possibility that the findings we obtained might
be explained by a mere increase in salience of the morality
concept. If it is moral rationalization that drives future behavior
rather than morality salience, effects should primarily emerge
when participants are asked to engage in rationalization. We
present three studies in which we assessed the participants’
moral identities and had them generate moral rationalizations
(depicting the immoral behaviors as being acceptable) versus
moral objections (depicting the immoral behaviors as being
inacceptable). To ensure that effects were uniquely connected
to the aftermath of immoral behavior, we also manipulated
whether prior behavior pertained to ethical vs. unethical
behavior. After all, if we would find that moral rationalizations
only evoke unethical behavior after previously having shown
unethical behavior (and not after previously having shown
ethical behavior), then this suggests that moral rationalizations
contribute to the escalation of one’s prior unethical behavior and
not so much as an independent instigator of unethical behavior
in itself. In agreement with past research we expected moral
rationalization to increase subsequent unethical behavior, but
primarily after having performed immoral behavior. This setup
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allowed us to test whether moral rationalization would impact
high moral identifiers more or less than low moral identifiers.
For all experiments, we have reported all measures, conditions,
data exclusions, and mention how we determined the sample
sizes. The data of all studies and supplementary material are
publicly available at https://osf.io/rkgcs/files/.
STUDY 1
To provide a first test of our (three-way) interaction hypothesis,
we assessed our participants’ moral identity before presenting
them a scenario depicting a setting in which they had or had not
engaged in morally questionable behavior. We opted for a mild
transgression, to prevent that the participants would not picture
themselves showing the behavior in the first place. After reading
the scenario, participants were either requested to generate moral
rationalizations (i.e., write why their behavior had not been
problematic), or generate moral objections (i.e., write why their
behavior had been problematic).
Method
Participants and Design
A power analysis (using G∗Power 3.1, F-test) indicated that –
to obtain significant medium effects (f = 0.25) with a statistical
power of 0.80 per effect and an alpha of 0.05 – we needed
at least 128 participants. In the context of a research method
class of a European University, eight students aimed to
recruit 50 participants each (in their social environments, in
public places, and in various organizations they had access
to). This led to 373 participants (170 males, 197 females,
6 unknown; Mage = 32.4 years, SDage = 13.56). Participants
had a wide variety of jobs and educational background (32%
university education, 27% higher vocational education, 21%
lower vocational education, and 13% high school). They were
randomly assigned to one of the conditions in the 2 (prior
behavior: unethical vs. ethical) × 2 (moral argumentation:
moral rationalization vs. moral objection) factorial design. Moral
identity was a (measured) continuous independent variable.
Procedure
Participants first filled in the internalization subscale of Aquino
and Reed’s (2002) moral identity measure and, after that,
another personality scale that was unrelated to this study. This
internalization subscale of moral identity taps into the degree
to which moral traits are central to the self-concept and has
been used in several studies of moral functioning (Aquino and
Reed, 2002; Reynolds and Ceranic, 2007; Detert et al., 2008;
Aquino et al., 2009). The measure presents respondents with
nine characteristics that might describe a person (i.e., caring,
compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking,
honest, and kind), and then asks them to visualize “the kind
of person who has these characteristics [and] imagine how that
person would think, feel, and act.” After this, on a seven-
point Likert response scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly
agree) participants indicated their agreement with five items:
(1) “It would make me feel good to be a person who has these
characteristics,” (2) “Being someone who has these characteristics
is an important part of who I am,” (3) “I would be ashamed
to be a person who had these characteristics (reverse scored),”
(4) “Having these characteristics is not really important to
me (reverse scored),” and (5) “I strongly desire to have these
characteristics” for each of the items. The items were averaged to
determine the moral identity score for each participant (α = 0.73).
All participants subsequently read a scenario describing
an international company in which employees often go on
business trips abroad for which travel costs, including meals,
are reimbursed. To offer some information that could later
on be used for generating moral rationalizations, the company
was described as being a bit cheap on salary and bonuses and
participants were asked to imagine feeling slightly underpaid. The
scenario described a business trip in China, in which they had
dined with three others. The bill was in Chinese and therefore
hard to interpret. They could only figure out the total amount,
which in terms of euros amounted to €40. They all had split
the bill, each of them only paid €10. In the previous ethical
behavior condition, participants imagined that they subsequently
reimbursed the €10. In the previous unethical behavior condition,
participants imagined that they had reimbursed the total amount
of €40.
Then, the moral argumentation manipulation was induced
by an argumentation assignment. In the moral rationalization
condition participants were asked, with the first reimbursement
scenario in mind, to write a plea in which they argued why
it would be okay (either according to themselves or to others)
to reimburse the whole bill. They were asked to write down
these reasons as convincingly as they could. It was stressed
that it did not matter whether they personally agreed to this
reasoning and that, even if they might not agree, the task was
to write down good reasons why it would be okay. In the moral
objection condition they had the same assignment, except that
they were asked to write down reasons why it was not okay to
reimburse the whole bill.
After this, all participants were presented a second scenario,
this time concerning a business trip in Jordan. They imagined
to have dined with three partners, split the bill and paid their
share of the bill.1 The bill was written in Arabic so that only
the total amount was clear and that it could also be interpreted
as an already split-up bill for one person. Then, behavioral
intentions regarding their reimbursements were assessed by
asking participants to what extent they were inclined to reimburse
the full amount without mentioning that the bill was for four
persons (1 = absolutely not, 7 = absolutely).2
Finally, it was checked whether participants had filled in
the survey in the correct order and they were thanked for
their participation.
1For exploratory reasons we also varied the size of this bill, being either €20
or €100. This did not affect the results in any way, so these two versions were
aggregated. Controlling for this variable rendered similar results.
2We also included several exploratory measures: power, need for consistency,
motivation to compensate, emotions (among which guilt), some checks,
rule breaking and deterrence perceptions, moral acceptability, and a moral
rationalization Likert scale. Analyses on moral acceptability perceptions and guilt
are presented in the supplementary material.
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Results
Participants who did not fill in this argumentation task (6), said
to have filled it in afterward (2), or clearly argued contrary to what
they were assigned to do (15), were excluded from our analyses.
Moral identity was standardized, and for the regression analyses
cross products were calculated for the interaction terms. Prior
behavior and moral argumentation were effect coded (−1 vs. 1).
Reimbursements
Regression analyses were used to test how moral identity, in
combination with our manipulations, affected reimbursement
intentions. We tested our hypothesis in three regression steps,
shown in Table 1. First, unethical reimbursement behavior was
regressed on the moral argumentation, prior behavior, and moral
identity. This model was significant F(3,347) = 9.76, p < 0.001,
R2 = 0.08) and yielded main effects for moral argumentation
(B = 0.55, p < 0.001) and prior behavior (B = 0.27, p = 0.02).
Second, the two-way interactions were included, which did not
significantly change the explained variance. The main effect
of moral argumentation and the absence of an interaction
between moral argumentation and previous behavior suggests
that moral argumentation in itself affects the behavior that
follows it, but that moral argumentation, on the whole, does not
contribute to escalation of previous unethical behavior. When
the hypothesized three-way interaction was included in the third
step, this changed the model in a marginal significant way,
1F(1,343) = 3.07, p = 0.08, R2 = 0.09, 1R2 = 0.01, and the Moral
Argumentation × Prior behavior × Moral Identity interaction
was marginally significant (B = 0.21, p = 0.08). This interaction
is plotted in Figures 1A,B.
Follow-up analyses of this interaction showed that when prior
behavior had been unethical, low moral identifiers who had
generated moral rationalizations were more inclined to engage
in unethical reimbursement than those who had generated moral
objections (B = 0.76, p < 0.001). For high identifiers this
relation was not significant (B = 0.38, p = 0.10). These patterns
suggest that, after prior unethical behavior, moral rationalization
increases subsequent unethical behavior more strongly for low
TABLE 1 | Results of Hierarchical Regression on unethical reimbursing as a
function of moral argumentation, previous behavior and moral identity (Study 1).
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
B B B
Moral rationalization (yes) 0.55∗∗ 0.55∗∗ 0.54∗∗
Previous behavior (moral) 0.27∗ 0.27∗ 0.26∗
Moral Identity −0.13 −0.13 −0.15
Moral rationalization × Previous behavior −0.02 −0.03
Moral rationalization × Moral Identity 0.02 0.01
Moral Identity × Previous behavior 0.09 0.10
Moral rationalization × Moral
Identity × Previous behavior
0.21+
R2 0.08∗ 0.08∗ 0.09∗
1R2 0.00 0.01+
+p < 0.10; ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01.
moral identifiers than for high moral identifiers. We also
reasoned that after having shown ethical behavior, the subsequent
generation of moral rationalizations (versus moral objections)
should have less impact, as no prior behavior needed to be
justified. In agreement with this, we observed a non-significant
effect among those with a low moral identity (B = 0.30, p = 0.23).
In contrast to this notion, however, we did observe a significant
effect among those with a high moral identity (B = 0.73,
p = 0.001). We return to this observation in the Discussion.3
Discussion
The results suggest that, overall, engaging in moral
rationalizations does not induce continuance of prior unethical
behavior per se, but that it does so more strongly for low moral
identifiers. The three-way interaction supports a motivational
account, showing that generating moral rationalizations only
affects low moral identifiers’ unethical behavior if prior to this
they engaged in unethical behavior. Moral rationalizations thus
did not evoke unethical behavior for those who previously had
chosen the moral path.
The finding that generating moral rationalizations after prior
unethical behavior promotes further unethical behavior more
for those with a low moral identity than for those with a high
moral identity, suggests that having a high moral identity may
reduce the likelihood to further tread the path of escalation or
continuation. Our interpretation is that for those with a high
moral identity, these self-generated moral rationalizations are less
likely to serve as a viable excuse for further unethicality. This
favors the explanation that low moral identifiers are more likely
than high moral identifiers to conclude from their own moral
rationalizations that the behavior is morally acceptable, and feel
less guilty about their previous acts.
In our introduction, we reasoned that the type of generated
arguments (moral rationalizations vs. moral objection) would
have little or no effect if one would previously have behaved
ethically. While this was true for those with a low moral identity,
we found that high moral identifiers who had previously shown
the moral behavior (i.e., only reimbursed their own share of
the bill) were affected by the generation of arguments. They
were subsequently less likely to unethically reimburse the total
amount after having generated reasons as to why it would not
be OK to reimburse the entire bill than after having generated
reasons as to why that would be OK. A plausible post hoc
explanation for this finding is that after having just behaved
ethically, generating moral objections to immoral behavior may
affirm high moral identifiers in the importance they ascribe to
being ethical, making them (even) less susceptible to make future
unethical reimbursements. Study 2 allowed us to test whether this
unanticipated effect would replicate.
3A critical reader could argue that our results may have been due to the
fact that it is harder for high moral identifiers to generate compelling moral
rationalizations, which may have made the moral rationalizations of high moral
identifiers less influential than those of low moral identifiers. To check this, the
pleas that respondents wrote were coded on the length (number of words) and
“compellingness” (by two raters on a Likert scale, Pearson’s r = 0.69). Analyses
showed that length and compellingness of the plea were not influenced by an
interaction of moral identity and moral argumentation. Also, controlling for length
and compellingness of the plea did not change the results.
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FIGURE 1 | Influence of moral argumentation and moral identity on unethical reimbursing for the previously ethical behavior condition (panel A on the left) and for the
previously unethical behavior condition (panel B on the right), Study 1.
STUDY 2
Study 2 had the same design as Study 1. Its first aim was to
replicate the finding in Study 1 that, after a prior immoral act,
moral rationalization (as compared to moral objection) would
increase subsequent unethical behavior, but more so for low
moral identifiers than for high moral identifiers. Second, to
contribute to external validity of the results, Study 2 focused
on a different type of unethical behavior. Reasoning that the
type of unethical behavior in Study 1 (reimbursing costs of
dinners) may not have been a standard that our participants
had often encountered in their lives, we used a setting that
would probably be more familiar (i.e., being given back too
much change in a sales interaction)4. Another improvement
was that, in Study 2, we used a long time lag between the
measurement of moral identity and the actual study. This is to
rule out that the results with regard to moral identity can be




The same power analysis as in Study 1, that indicated a desired
minimum of 128 participants, applied to Study 2. We aimed for
160 participants (psychology undergraduates who participated
for course credits) and ended up with recruiting 150 (39 males;
Mage = 19.35, SDage = 1.90). They were randomly assigned
4We also checked this by asking participants at the end of Study 2 whether they
had ever experienced a situation in which they had been offered too much change
after buying something; 75% of the participants noted that they indeed had such
an experience. Of these participants, 10% said they had not mentioned it and kept
the money, 23% had mentioned it and returned the money; the remaining 67%
reported having shown both behaviors: they had at least once kept the money
and at least once returned the money. These numbers showed that the setting of
receiving too much change is indeed familiar to most, and that it does create some
ambiguity on how to respond.
to one of the conditions in the 2 (prior behavior: unethical
versus ethical) × 2 (moral rationalization: moral rationalization
vs. moral objection) factorial design. Moral identity was again
measured as continuous independent variable.
Procedure
In the beginning of the year, participants filled in a test battery
of personality questions, including moral identity. Moral identity
was measured in the same way as in Study 1 (α = 0.79).
About a month later, they were re-invited to the laboratory
and filled in a paper-and-pencil survey that was called an
“Argumentation Study.” First, they were explained the global idea
of the argumentation task they were about to engage in. Then,
they read the scenario.
Participants were asked to imagine that they were doing
groceries in the supermarket and, because they were a bit short
on money, they restricted themselves to cheap products. Next,
they imagined that, after 10 min in the queue, they checked
out, but that the cashier, being absent-minded, gave back too
much change, namely €5 too much. In the prior unethical
behavior condition they were asked to imagine that they did
not mention the mistake and walked away with €5 too much.
In the prior ethical behavior condition they were asked to
imagine that they said “This is €5 too much” and returned the
money to the cashier.
Subsequently, participants engaged in the argumentation task.
As in Study 1, participants in the moral rationalization condition
wrote a plea in which they rationalized that keeping the money
was okay, and participants in the moral objection condition
argued that keeping the money was not okay. Only now, this
was done by means of five statements of which participants
were requested to, irrespective or their own opinion, argue in
favor of or against. Again, it was stressed that it did not matter
whether they agreed with these arguments, but that the only
important thing was that they argued as convincingly as possible.
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The five statements were: (1) It is unprofessional of the cashier
to be so absent-minded, (2) Keeping the €5 is disadvantageous
for the cashier, (3) Keeping the €5 is, in fact, stealing, (4)
It is not my responsibility that the supermarket loses €5, (5)
Most others would keep the money. So, statements 1, 4, and
5 were moral rationalizations and statements 2 and 3 were
moral objections. Behind each statement it was clearly printed
whether they should argue in favor or against the statement,
and enough space available to write down a short story. In the
moral rationalization condition, participants were asked to argue
in favor of statements 1, 4, and 5, and against statements 2 and 3.
In the moral objections condition this was the other way around:
participants were asked to argue in favor of statements 2 and 3
and against statements 1, 4, and 5.
Then, ethical behavior was measured by presenting them with
another scenario. In this scenario, they were asked to imagine
that they were at the market and were paying the greengrocer,
took the change and walked on. About 20 m further, while they
were putting the change in their wallets, they noticed that the
greengrocer had given them back too much money (€10, which is
$12). Unethical behavior was measured by the question “What do
you do? Do you go back to correct the mistake or do you walk on
and keep the €10?” This was measured on a four-point Likert scale
(1 = I absolutely go back to correct the mistake, 4 = I absolutely
walk on and keep the €10). So, higher values reflected stronger
unethical behavior intentions5.
Finally, participants were asked whether they had ever
experienced a setting in which they had received too much
change (see Footnote 6), after which they were thanked for
their participation.
Results
We excluded two participants from further data analyses. One
participant for not filling in the argumentation task, and one for
writing an argument for only one statement, that was also in
the opposite direction of what he/she was assigned to do. Moral
identity was standardized, and for the regression analyses cross
products were calculated for the interaction terms. Prior behavior
and moral argumentation were effect coded (−1 vs. 1).
Unethical Behavior
The hypothesis was tested in three regression steps (see also
Table 2). First, unethical behavior was regressed on the moral
argumentation, on the prior behavior, and on moral identity.
This model was significant F(3,141) = 4.12, p = 0.008, R2 = 0.08)
with main effects for moral argumentation (B = 0.17, p = 0.01)
and moral identity (B = −0.17, p = 0.01). Second, the two-
way interactions were included, which did not significantly
change the explained variance. Third, the hypothesized three-way
interaction was included. This changed the model significantly,
1F(1,137) = 6.93, p = 0.009, R2 = 0.14,1R2 = 0.04, and the Moral
Argumentation × Prior Behavior × Moral Identity interaction
5We also included several exploratory measures: perspective taking, social
value orientation, emotions (among which guilt), a moral rationalization Likert
scale, moral acceptability perceptions and realism checks. Analyses on moral
acceptability perceptions and guilt are presented in the supplementary material.
TABLE 2 | Results of Hierarchical Regression on unethical behavior (keeping the
money) as a function of moral argumentation, previous behavior and moral
identity (Study 2).
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
B B B
Moral rationalization (yes) 0.17∗ 0.16∗ 0.20∗∗
Previous behavior (moral) −0.10 −0.09 −0.11+
Moral Identity −0.17∗ −0.19∗∗ −0.23∗∗
Moral argumentation × Previous behavior −0.04 −0.04
Moral argumentation × Moral Identity −0.08 −0.09
Moral Identity × Previous behavior −0.01 0.04
Moral argumentation × Moral
Identity × Previous behavior
0.18∗∗
R2 0.08∗ 0.09∗ 0.14∗
1R2 0.01 0.04∗∗
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; +p < 0.10.
was significant (B = 0.18, p = 0.009). This interaction is plotted in
Figures 2A,B.
Follow-up analyses of this interaction showed that, when
prior behavior was immoral, moral rationalization led to more
unethical behavior than moral objection among those with a
low moral identity (B = 0.51, p < 0.001). Moral argumentation
did not significantly affect those with a high moral identifiers
(B = −0.04, p = 0.72). When prior behavior was moral, moral
argumentation did not increase affect reimbursing among high
moral identifiers (B = 0.25, p = 0.14), nor among low moral
identifiers (B = 0.07, p = 0.60). This supported the hypothesis that,
when prior behavior is unethical, moral rationalization increases
subsequent unethical behavior more so for low moral identifiers
than for high moral identifiers and that this is not the case when
prior behavior is ethical6.
Discussion
Study 2 replicated the results of Study 1 for a different kind
of immoral behavior. Again, the results show that after having
behaved unethically, engaging in moral rationalizations promotes
unethical behavior more among low moral identifiers than
among high moral identifiers. Now, no strong indication was
found that generating moral objections has positive effects for
high moral identifiers who have behaved ethically.
STUDY 3
Studies 1 and 2 show that moral rationalizations may instigate
future unethical behavior, especially if one’s prior behavior was
unethical, and for those with a low moral identity. We were
able to demonstrate this by using scenarios that allowed us
to vary the prior behavior (ethical versus unethical). We, of
6For the same reason as in Study 1, length and compellingness of the pleas were
coded by two independent raters (Pearson’s r = 0.80). These measures were not
influenced by a combination of moral identity and moral argumentation had no
interactive effect on these two measures. Also, controlling for these two measure
did not change the results.
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FIGURE 2 | Influence of moral argumentation and moral identity on unethical behavior (keeping the money) for the previously ethical behavior condition (panel A on
the left) and for the previously unethical behavior condition (panel B on the right), Study 2.
course, realize that a limitation of this method is that the
prior behavior was not self-chosen, and that decisions were
hypothetical. We designed Study 3 to study whether the observed
relations also generalize to actual unethical behavior. In this
study, we first assessed participants’ actual degree of unethicality
in a first setting, then had them generate moral arguments,
after which we assessed their degree of unethicality in a second
setting. This setup enabled us to compare prior and subsequent
unethical behavior.
This setting also allowed us to address another issue.
Escalation can take the form of engaging in new unethical
acts, but also in increasing the level of unethicality in such
acts. Studies 1 and 2 could not distinguish between both forms
since the participants could not freely select the magnitude
of their (new) unethicality. To distinguish between escalation
by engaging in a new acts at a similar level of intensity and
escalation by engaging in new acts at a higher level of unethicality,
we used a setup that allowed participants to deceive another
person, but also to select the extent to which they would deceive
the other. This setup allowed us to test whether escalation
would take the form of continuing in (new) unethical acts
at a similar level of unethicality, or at an increased level.
Moreover, it allowed us to test whether these forms would be




Study 3 did not manipulate prior behavior and thus only had
two conditions (moral argumentation: moral rationalization vs.
moral objection) to which participants were randomly assigned.
Moral identity was a (measured) continuous independent
variable. We aimed for 120 business students who participated
for course credits or money, and ended up with recruiting 109
(59 males; Mage = 19.73, SDage = 2.04).
Procedure
Participants were invited into the laboratory and were guided into
a cubicle in which the computer experiment took place. First, they
filled in a battery of personality questions, among which moral
identity scale (α = 0.67).
Then, the participants presented a setting that was modeled
after Gneezy’s (2005) cheating game. Participants were informed
that they would be paired to another research participant in a
task that would involve the distribution of money. They were
told that, at the end of the entire study, one of the pairs
would be randomly selected and that its members would obtain
the monetary outcomes of the allocation they had made. All
participants learned that in their pair, they were “player 1”
and their partner was “player 2.” Subsequently, the rules of
the monetary allocation task were explained. It was explained
that player 2 would be presented with 10 options, that each
represented a certain distribution of money. Player 2’s task
was to pick one of the options, but was not informed what
distribution each option represented. The participants did know
the distributions for the options, and – knowing this – had to
advise player 2.
Being informed of the distribution, the participants learned
as player 1 that the 10 options (labeled option A to option J;
see Appendix) represented distributions of 50 euros, that were
increasingly more profitable for themselves, but increasingly less
profitable for player 2. Option A was thus the most advantageous
option for player 2 (Allocating 50 euros to player 2 and 0 to
player 1), and option J was the most disadvantageous for player
2 (allocating 0 euros to player 2 and 50 euros to player 1).
Participants could then only inform player 2 which option was
most advantageous for player 2. Since player 2 was unaware
of the actual distribution, this allowed participants to deceive
their partner. Participants could choose from 10 messages that
corresponded to the 10 options A–J. For example, message 3 was
“Option C will earn you the most.” While an honest message
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would require participants to send message 1 and thus inform
player 2 that A was the most advantageous option, sending
messages 2–10 (referring player 2 to options B–J) would be
increasingly deceptive, and increasingly in the own advantage.
It was stressed that player 2 would never find out about the
distributions attached to the different options. The only thing
(s)he would know was – if the bonus would be awarded – how
much (s)he got awarded him/herself.
After participants had made their decision about which
message to send, they engaged in an argumentation task in which
moral rationalization was manipulated. Moral argumentation
was manipulated as in Study 1, this time pertaining the act of
sending an untruthful message.
Then, they were presented with the same decision for the
second time (it was made clear that this would be the last
time). It was stressed that the person to whom they were
coupled this second time, was a different person than the one
they were coupled with the first time. The main characteristics
of the decision situation were repeated, and they were again
asked to choose between the 10 messages. Finally, participants
were debriefed and, 1 week later, one participant was randomly
selected and awarded a bonus according to his/her decision7.
Results
Chosen Messages
As a first identification of the main messages the participants sent,
we explored the frequency data. These data showed that there
were clearly four messages that were chosen most frequently sent
to player 2 (covering 85% of all messages sent in round 1, and
87% in round 2). One of the four mostly used messages was to
truthfully conveyed that option A was the most advantageous for
player 2. This message was chosen by 15% of the participants
in round 1 and 19% in round 2. All other participants sent a
deceptive message. A high percentage of the participants (40%
in round one and 35% in round two), informed player 2 that
it would be most advantageous to select option F; the option
that yielded an almost equal distribution, but slightly in favor of
the participant. Another part of the participants (20% in round
one and 22% in round two) informed player 2 that option E
was most advantageous; the option that also was close to an
equal distribution, but slightly in favor of player 2. The most
extreme form of deception, identifying the option that was most
advantageous to the participant as the option that would be most
advantageous to player 1 was used by 10% of the participants in
round 1 and 11% in round 2).
With regard to the difference between round 1 and 2, a paired
sample t-test showed that respondents told slightly less extreme
lies in round 2 (M = 5.67, SD = 2.37) than in round 1 (M = 5.43,
SD = 2.68), t(108) = 1.75, p = 0.08. Although this was a marginal
effect, it suggests that, overall, respondents were more inclined
to de-escalate than to escalate in their deceptive behavior. There
was no correlation between moral identity and deception in the
7We also included several exploratory measures: a few personality measures,
emotions, commitment, perceptions of both decisions, choice strategy, a moral
rationalization Likert scale, moral acceptability, self-ratings, intentions to donate
to charity, and some checks. Analyses on moral acceptability perceptions and guilt
are presented in the supplementary material.
first round (r = 0.14, p = 0.13) or in the second round (r = 0.001,
p = 0.99). So there was no indication that high moral identifiers
were less likely to send a deceptive message than low moral
identifiers, which supports the notion that “good people” (i.e.,
those who strongly value morality) can actually “do bad things”
(Bersoff, 1999; De Cremer, 2011; Gino, 2015).
Escalation
As Studies 1 and 2 indicated, moral rationalizations primarily
promote subsequent unethical behavior if the prior behavior was
unethical as well. Accordingly, we first analyzed the behavior of
those who had not deceived player 2 in round 1. This exploration
indeed indicated that all of these participants also decided to
truthfully inform their opponent in round 2.
To identify possible escalation (or de-escalation) we therefore
proceeded with analyzing only the decisions of participants who
had sent a deceptive message in round 1 (85% of the participants).
Then – to obtain a measure of escalation – we calculated the
difference between the message scores (which could run from 1
to 10) of round 2 minus those of round 18. As a result a difference
score of 0 shows escalation by engaging in a new unethical act
of deception that is as unethical as the deceptive behavior one
performed in round 1 (the same level of deception in round
2 than in round 1), while positive scores denote escalation by
engaging in a new unethical act at a higher level of intensity (more
extreme deception in round 2 than in round 1).
The escalation scores were distributed in a non-normal
way: 68% of the participants sent the same message in the
first and in the second round, resulting in an escalation score
of “0.” Also, there were infrequent extreme deviations from the
mean (i.e., scores of −7, −5, and 4). To test whether indeed
the distribution was non-normal, the kurtosis was calculated,
and indeed appeared to be extremely high (z-score = 12.61),
suggesting that a transformation of the escalation score was
warranted (see Field, 2005). We therefore transformed the
escalation measure into a trichotomous one: participants with
lower levels of deception in round 2 than in round 1 were coded
as “−1” (de-escalation), and those with higher levels of deception
in round 2 than in round 1 one as “1” (escalation at an increased
intensity level). Those with the same levels of deception in round
2 and 2 were coded as “0” (escalation at the same intensity level).
This led to a kurtosis within the normal range (z-score = 0.29).
To test whether moral identity modulated the tendency to
escalate, three regression steps were performed. Moral identity
was standardized and cross products were calculated for the
interaction terms. First, the transformed escalation score was
regressed on the moral argumentation and on moral identity.
This model was marginally significant F(2,90) = 2.53, p = 0.09,
R2 = 0.05) and rendered a main effect for moral identity
(B = −0.12, p = 0.03). There was no main effect of moral
rationalization (B = 0.03, p = 0.62), again indicating that
moral rationalization, overall, had no influence on escalation.
However, when the two-way interaction between moral identity
and the moral argumentation was included, the model changed
8Because for this analysis we excluded those who had sent a truthful message in
round 1, these scores ranged from 2 to 10.
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FIGURE 3 | Escalation of unethical behavior (lying) as a function of moral
argumentation and moral identity (Study 3).
significantly, 1F(1,89) = 4.26, p = 0.04, R2 = 0.10, 1R2 = 0.04,
and the Moral Argumentation × Moral Identity interaction was
significant (B = −0.11, p = 0.04). Follow-up analyses of this
interaction showed that, albeit marginally, moral rationalization
(as compared to moral objection) increased escalation among
low moral identifiers (B = 0.14, p = 0.07) and did not increase
escalation among high moral identifiers (B = −0.08, p = 0.31).
See Figure 39.
Discussion
Study 3 confirms that moral rationalization contributes more to
the escalation of unethical behavior when moral identity is low
than when it is high. Importantly, we were able to reveal this
process by using real behavioral choices. In contrast to studies
1 and 2, participants were not asked to imagine having engaged
in morally questionable behavior, but they actually did engage
in such behaviors. Moreover, by comparing behavior in round 1
and 2, we were able to show the direction of the change. While
for about two-thirds (68%) of the participants escalation took
the form of showing new unethical behavior at the same level
of intensity as before, the remaining participants did change
the intensity. Our analysis also shows the direction of change.
The interaction we observed suggests that escalation in levels of
intensity tended to be more likely among low moral identifiers
than among high moral identifiers, when they had engaged in
moral rationalization.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Moral rationalizations are often thought to facilitate the
continuation, or even escalation, of immoral behavior. However,
this causal relation was never put to the test. Most of
9As in Studies 1 and 2, length and compellingness of the pleas were coded,
now by three independent raters [ICC (2,3) = 0.77]. Moral identity and moral
argumentation had no combined effect on these two measures. Also, controlling
for these two measure did not change the results.
the literature on escalation of immoral behaviors consists of
theory papers (e.g., Ashforth and Anand, 2003; Tenbrunsel
and Messick, 2004; Anand et al., 2005; Zyglidopoulos et al.,
2009). A few exceptions are empirical research about the role
of commitment in escalation of killing (Martens et al., 2007,
2010), about gradual (and unnoticed) erosion of unethical
practices (Gino and Bazerman, 2009), and about the relation
between moral disengagement and escalation (Welsh et al.,
2015), showing mainly the relationship between one’s propensity
to morally disengage (as an individual difference variable)
and (un)ethical behavior (Bandura et al., 1996; Detert et al.,
2008; Moore et al., 2008). Only few studies tapped into causal
influences of moral rationalization, but did so by testing
moral rationalization effects in indirect ways. They showed that
situations that allow for moral rationalizations, for example,
another person benefiting from the unethical act (Wiltermuth,
2011), circumstances decreasing one’s sense of responsibility
(Bersoff, 1999), or the presence of counterfactual information
about “how circumstances could have been different” (Shalvi
et al., 2011), evoke more unethical behavior. Whether the
actual generation of moral rationalizations induces immoral
behavior (and, more specific, the escalation of it) was not
yet established.
By explicitly asking participants to engage in moral
argumentation, we were able to identify a causal path. Across the
three studies we showed that generating moral rationalizations
for (as opposed to moral objections to) immoral behaviors
evokes further immoral behaviors more among those with a low
moral identity than among those with a high moral identity.
Importantly, these effects emerged primarily after having
engaged in immoral acts. This suggests that moral rationalization
may particular be an issue of concern when it serves low moral
identifiers to justify one’s previous unethical behavior, as it then
opens the path for engaging in more unethical behavior. Further,
our studies suggest that effects of post hoc rationalizations may
show themselves in new unethical behaviors that resemble
the past transgressions in terms of unethicality, but also in
self-chosen increased levels of unethicality (as shown in Study
3 where low moral identifiers were more likely to choose a
more extreme form of dishonesty after having engaged in moral
rationalization).
The fact that the effects post hoc rationalizations can show
themselves in different ways, also raises the question of whether
escalation of unethicality may also occur over different domains
of behavior. For example, does post hoc rationalizations of a
specific behavior performed earlier (e.g., excessive reimbursing),
also promote future rule breaking in other domains (e.g.,
cheating on an exam)? Previous theorizing on rationalizations
suggests that this can be the case. More precisely, it has
been argued that moral rationalizations may be excessive in
relation to the actual act, which provides an impetus for
other types of immoral acts (Zyglidopoulos et al., 2009).
For example, after having engaged in excessive reimbursing a
person may rationalize that “everyone is dishonest now and
then.” Such rationalization would also cover cheating on an
exam. However, the rationalization “my reimbursement is only
very small considering the revenue of the organization” will
not automatically form a rationalization for cheating on an
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exam. Hence, whether engaging in moral rationalizations fosters
escalation of unethical behaviors in different domains, probably
depends on the type of moral rationalization that people engage
in. This would be an interesting topic for further research.
It should be noted that in our studies, we always contrasted
the generation of moral rationalizations with that of generating
moral objections. Because both types of moral argumentation
require one to consider the moral connotations of the
behavior, this allowed us to test whether the nature of moral
argumentations affects subsequent decisions. This also means
that we did not include a control condition in which participants,
for example, would not engage in any moral argumentation
(i.e., a setting in which the morality of the behavior would
not be additionally cued by moral argumentation). Future
research could include such a condition, which would allow for
studying whether the salience of morality concerns would have
an additional impact.
By studying how moral argumentations about prior behaviors
affected subsequent behavior we zoomed in on post hoc moral
rationalizations, which should be distinguished from moral
rationalizations that people may use to facilitate behavior that
one is about to show (ex ante). Post hoc moral rationalization
refers to the aftermath of unethical behavior; a highly relevant
phase considering that we all behave somewhat unethical once in
a while. As this forms a threat to the self-image of being moral
and honest (Mazar et al., 2008), people somehow need to deal
with this. Justifying why the previous unethical behavior was not
so unethical may seem an effective way to cope with the feelings
of guilt as a result of that behavior, thereby maintaining their
moral self-esteem. The relevance of the current studies, of course,
is that we demonstrated that its impact is not restricted to dealing
with the past; its effects may extend to future behaviors as well.
The current findings revealed this connection especially for those
with a low moral identity. An interpretation of this finding is that
post hoc moral rationalization was less likely to convince those
with a high moral identity that the unethical behavior is morally
acceptable, and hence less successful in reducing guilt. Hence,
engaging in post hoc moral rationalizations may especially induce
low identifiers to tread the path of unethical escalation.
By inducing participants to engage in moral argumentation,
we were able to further illuminate its causal path, and study to
what extent the path taken is dependent on one’s moral identity.
However, one may raise the questions of how the results relate
to settings in which the process of generating argumentations
is not externally stimulated and to what extent high moral
identifiers spontaneously engage in moral rationalizations after
having shown unethical behavior. To our knowledge, this
issue has not yet been addressed in the literature. In any
case, the studies that have been conducted would not support
the notion that high moral identifiers never engage in moral
rationalizations. True, there is previous research that finds that
moral identity negatively correlates with the one’s propensity to
morally disengage. However, these correlations are not critically
large, and vary from −0.24 (Detert et al., 2008), and −0.27
(Vitell et al., 2011), to −0.42 and −0.55 (Moore et al., 2012).
This suggests that there is a significant group of high moral
identifiers with a high propensity to morally disengage. Moreover,
even high moral identifiers with a low propensity to morally
disengage might engage in small unethical acts and justify this
with post hoc moral rationalization. After all, those with a
high moral identity might be especially motivated to restore
their moral self-image after doing so (see also Mulder and
Aquino, 2013). Some support for this was indeed found by
Aquino and Becker (2005) who tested the relation between
self-perceived moral attributes and neutralization techniques in
the context of negotiation. They found that, after concealing
information in a negotiation, self-perceived moral attributes were
positively related to certain types of neutralization strategies.
Future research could focus on the question how moral
identity and engaging in moral rationalization relate, and
take the distinction between post hoc and ex ante moral
rationalization into account.
While the main focus in our theorizing has been on the role of
moral rationalizations, the effect of generating moral objections
on behavior is also interesting. The data of Study 1 suggest that
after having behaved ethically, generating moral objections for
unethical behaviors makes high moral identifiers behave more
ethically. Possibly, generating (post hoc) moral objections may
work as an extra confirmation of one’s previous ethicality. This
might have been more impactful for high moral identifiers as
they are the ones who especially value being a moral person. For
them, such a confirmation might work as an extra motivating
power to act in line with what they previously did, or to express
more strong opinions in line their previous ethical behavior.
However, since this effect was unexpected and inconsistent (the
effect was only found in Study 1), it requires future research to
further address how the effects of moral objections be modulated
by moral identity.
A limitation of our research concerns the identification of
the psychological process that underlies our behavioral findings.
We suggested that, when moral identity is high, engaging in
moral rationalizations is less successful in convincing people
that their previous immoral act is morally acceptable, and thus
is also less successful in alleviating them from guilt. We did
measure guilt and moral acceptability perceptions. The results
for these measures are presented in the supplementary material10.
Indeed, the data of Study 2 show support for the notion that
the differential effect of MR on subsequent immoral behavior
can be explained by moral acceptability perceptions and guilt.
However, the data of Studies 1 and 3 do not. This could be due to
the fact that in these studies, the measure of moral acceptability
was taken toward the end of the study, and the measure
of guilt was measured after, rather than before, subsequent
behavior. Nevertheless, this explanation is post hoc and thus we
should be careful with drawing definite conclusions from this.
Future research is required to determine to what extent the
escalatory effect of moral rationalizations (and how this stronger
for low moral identifiers) is explained by moral acceptability
perceptions and guilt.
While the current findings suggest that post hoc moralizations
and moral identity impact how people deal with unethical
10https://osf.io/rkgcs/files/
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behavior, we do not want to overstate our case by claiming
that these factors alone suffice to explain the ethical decisions
people make. Indeed, we take to position that – like most
of the decisions people make – behavior is multi-determined.
Unethical decision making may also be related to other individual
differences, and situational features we did not investigate here.
The relatively low levels of explained variance that could be traced
back to post hoc rationalizations and moral identity serve as a
reminder that we should not overstate their explanatory power.
The findings do show, however, that it may be worthwhile to
further explore their effects.
CONCLUSION
Everyone behaves unethically once in a while. This paper tested
conditions under which such unethical acts either remain single
occasions or are continued. The results show that engaging in
post hoc moral rationalizations may especially lead low moral
identifiers engage in new unethical acts a second time, and even
increase the intensity level of unethicality. High moral identifiers,
are less likely to follow this path. With these results, the current
paper contributes to the understanding of continuation and
escalation of unethical behavior. It is our hope that the current
paper will inspire and help both scientists and practitioners
to identify the conditions that determine whether inevitable
occasions of unethical behavior go from bad to worse or remain
single occasions.
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APPENDIX: OPTIONS OF THE CHEATING GAME (STUDY 3)
Options and Their Distributions
Option A: you get €0, player 2 gets €50
Option B: you get €5, player 2 gets €45
Option C: you get €10, player 2 gets €40
Option D: you get €15, player 2 gets €35
Option E: you get €20, player 2 gets €30
Option F: you get €30, player 2 gets €20
Option G: you get €35, player 2 gets €15
Option H: you get €40, player 2 gets €10
Option I: you get €45, player 2 gets €5
Option J: you get €50, player 2 gets €0.
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